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1.0 Introduction 
In the past 15 years, the potential for climate change induced by the accumulation of GHG has 
become an environmental concern of global significance.  In 1990 many countries became part 
of the United Nations Framework Covention on Climate Change which as primary goal of the 
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions.  The Kyoto Accord, signed in December 1997, was  
an proposed agreement for signifcant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2008 
-  2012.  Although this agreement does not come into effect until countries with 55% of emission 
have ratified the agreement, there indications that it may be ratified in 2001.    
 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether greenhouse gas reduction is potentially an 
important issue for livestock trade. 
 
The remainder of the paper begins with brief background information on the climate change 
agreements and the greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural production with specific 
estimates for hogs.  This information is used to calculate the approximate size of a Pigovian (no 
pun intended) tax on hog production.  In order assess the potential trade impacts a simple six 
region model is developed and used to simulate the impact of Pigovian taxes with different 
international participation rates.  The paper is concluded with a discussion of the policy 
implication and a call to arms for more greenhouse gas abatement related trade research. Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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2.0 Background 
2.1 Climate Change Agreements 
In 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, many countries agreed in principle to stabilize Greenhouse Gas 
emissions creating the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 
1997). Despite the agreement, emissions continued to grow.  In 1997, the parties to the UNFCCC 
met again in Kyoto and made further commitments to limit and reduce GHG emissions. In the 
Kyoto Accord, the developed countries of the world agreed to specific emission targets to be 
achieved during the 2008–2012 period, relative to a 1990 baseline.  In this Accord, Canada 
committed to a reduction in GHG emissions to a level six percent less than 1990 emissions, the 
US agreed to a seven percent reduction and the EU agreed to an eight percent reduction 
(UNFCCC). These reduction targets are much more significant than the absolute percentages 
would suggest, given the growth in post 1990 emissions.  In Canada, the 6 percent Kyoto 
reduction target represents a 25 percent reduction below business as usual projections. 
 
At this point, the Kyoto Accord is very much an incomplete agreement.  First, the developing 
countries of the world, including the very populous India and China, are not signatories to the 
accord.  Many features are vaguely described such as "Joint Implementation" and "Clean 
Development Mechanisms". There are emission trading mechanisms that have yet to be defined.  
Many definitions and measurements have yet to be agreed upon, such as the definition of a 
managed versus an unmanaged forest.  While the decomposition of organic matter in agricultural 
soils has been defined as a source of CO2 in the Accord, soils are not included as a sink. A sink is 
a process whereby atmospheric CO2 is sequestered by plants and converted into organic matter 
where it is stored in the soil.   Similarly, the use of agricultural and forest crops in building Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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products are not yet included as sinks.  There are no agreed upon penalties for non-compliance 
within the Accord, which has important implications for trade.   
 
Despite the current incompleteness of the Accord, its greatest limitation is that it has yet to be 
ratified to become a binding agreement. The Accord does not “come into effect” until countries 
that make up 55 percent of the GHG emissions have ratified the agreement (UNFCCC).  In other 
words, if Canada were to ratify the agreement by having Parliament commit to the 6 percent 
reduction, this commitment would not be binding until enough other countries did likewise, 
bringing the Accord into effect.  This ratification process has introduced a great deal of 
uncertainty for the signatories because there is a good chance the Accord will not have sufficient 
ratification to come into effect. 
 
At this point, the United States Congress has not given Presidential Fast Track Approval to 
negotiate a climate change agreement. Without this approval, the US Congress would be able to 
vote on and accept particular parts of the Accord while rejecting other parts. As has been shown 
previously with trade agreements under these conditions, other countries will be very reluctant to 
ratify the Accord.  Furthermore, given that the US makes up 35 percent of total GHG emissions, 
the US ratification is pivotal to the overall agreement. 
2.2Agricultural GHG Emissions 
The agricultural sector is a significant global GHG emitter. Each country has different levels of 
emissions depending on the agricultural systems employed. The agricultural emissions from 
Canada are provided below to give some idea of the magnitude and the sources of GHG 
emissions in agriculture. Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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The estimates of 1991 GHG emissions for Canada and those associated with Canadian 
agriculture are shown in Table 1. There are several interesting points in this table.   First, direct 
and indirect emissions from agriculture make up 14 percent of the total Canadian GHG 
emissions, thus agriculture is nationally important.  Nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) 
dominate direct emissions from agriculture, while carbon dioxide (CO2), N2O and CH4 are all 
significant indirect emissions. Although non-agricultural Canadian emissions are dominated by 
CO2, overall agricultural emissions have a large component of N2O and CH4. 
 
Table 1: Canadian Total and Agricultural Anthropogenic GHG Emissions in 1991 
 
  All  Sources  Direct Ag.  Indirect Ag.  Total Ag.  %  Ag. 
  Million tonnes of CO2 Equivalent 
Carbon dioxide  452  5  15  20  4% 
Methane 70  20 9  29  41% 
Nitrous oxide  51  24  10  34  66% 
Total 575  49  34  83  14% 
 
Source:  Jansen et al., 1999 
 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) is the GHG producing the largest net CO2 equivalent emissions from 
agriculture (Jansen et al.).  About one-half of agricultural N2O emissions are created primarily 
from the nitrogen cycle occurring within agricultural soils.  During the processes of nitrification, 
(the conversion of NH4
+ to NO3 
– by soil bacteria) and denitrification (the conversion of NO3
- to 
N2), N2O is released into the atmosphere.  The amount of nitrogen released is dependent upon 
many factors, including moisture levels, carbon and nitrogen availability, and temperature.  This Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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N2O release occurs with both natural forms of nitrogen, i.e. from manure and legumes; and from 
manufactured forms of nitrogen, i.e. nitrogen fertilizer.  The release of nitrous oxide tends to be 
very episodic with large quantities released in very short periods. The other sources of N2O 
emissions are from the decomposition of manure during storage and application and from its 
release during the manufacture of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs. The estimates of the 
emissions of nitrous oxide from Canadian agriculture are very preliminary and will be the focus 
of study and measurement for the next several years. 
 
Methane is the other important GHG in agriculture.  Methane is released during anaerobic 
decomposition of organic matter.  By far the largest source of CH4 emissions within agriculture 
is from enteric fermentation within the rumen of beef and dairy cattle, accounting for 80 percent 
of agricultural methane emissions.  Most of the remaining 20 percent of methane emissions 
comes from the decomposition of all forms of livestock and poultry manures during storage and 
handling. This is the major source of GHG emission from hog production. 
 
2.3 Estimating economic costs GHG emissions for hog production 
The production of hogs involves the emission of methane and nitrous oxide.  The methane 
emissions come primarily from the anaerobic decomposition of manure during the storage and 
spreading of the manure.  The majority of nitrous oxide emissions, (which is less than 1/2 of the 
total) are from the nitrogen in the manure once applied to the field.  These nitrous oxide 
emissions cannot be fully attributed to hog production because other forms of nitrogen would 
likely be applied to these same soils in the absence of hog manure. However, the high levels of Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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manure application, along with water and carbon in the liquid manure slurry, make nitrous oxide 
emissions higher than would be the case with other nitrogen forms.  
 
The estimates of GHG emissions from hog production are shown in Table 2.  The methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions are shown in the second and third columns and are converted into carbon 
dioxide equivalents in the fourth column.   The final column has valued these emissions in terms 
of abatement costs.  The abatement cost of  $20 per tonne represents the conservative end of the 
range of marginal costs required to meet the Kyoto commitments within Canadian economy.   
One can think of the cost as the price for a one tonne emission permit in a carbon trading system. 
If emissions per hog are in fixed proportion the cost per hog would equal the optimal Pigovian 
tax on hog production. The actual value of the abatement costs will largely be determined by 
how aggressive the governments are with respect to GHG reduction and the technologies that 
will become available once appropriate incentives have been put in place.  The purpose is to 
show the order of magnitude of this external environmental cost relative to the market costs of 
producing pork.  As is shown in the last row of Table 2 this cost translate into $50 per tonne of 
pork meat, or about 6% of the current price.  These are not inconsequential costs and therefore 
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Table 2: Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Hog Production – Canada -1999 
      










        
Per  head of inventory  11.5  0.439  378  $7.55 
per head sold   6.8  0.26  223  $4.46 
Per  tonne of  carcass wt.  81.8  3.1  2690  $53.74 
Source: Jansen 2000, and authors calculations 
 
a The nitrous oxide and the methane are expressed in 100 year global warming potential as prescribed by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change which 21 times for methane and 310 times for nitrous oxide. 
b The estimated external abatement costs of CO2 reduction vary a great deal $20 US per tonne is conservative 
estimate with current technologies. 
c These coefficients are the same used to calculate Canadian GHG emissions and include direct as well as indirect 
emissions August 2000 (Jansen, 2000) 
d This calculation is based on the 1999 Canadian (AFFC) marketings to inventory ratio 






3.0 Description of the Trade Simulation Model  
For the purposes of modelling the impact of GHG policies on trade a simple a six region static 
trade model is used to examine impacts in a four year (2004) and a nine year (2009) timeframe.  
The six regions modelled are Canada, China, EU, Japan, USA and the Rest of World (ROW).   
 
The impacts of environmental policy scenarios are modelled relative to the 2000, Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), World Outlook 2000 estimates for the years 
2004 and 2009. These quantities used to construct the baseline are shown in Table 3. Data for 
1999 is included for comparison purposes. The FAPRI 2004 and 2009 price forecast for Iowa-Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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southern Minnesota barrows and gilts are reported in Table 4.  These price and quantity forecasts 
are based on the large forecasting model, FAPRI, which incorporates many relationships, 
including macroeconomic variables, policy variables as well as extensive agricultural market 
interaction. 
 
To examine the impact of various environmental policies each region is assumed to have simple 
linear supply and demand schedules.  The world market is assumed to clear at a single world 
price (the Iowa barrows and gilts price) when the total quantity supplied is equal to total quantity 
demanded. The elasticities of each supply and demand curve reported by Srivastava are shown in 
Table 5.   The slope and intercept of each supply and demand curve is constructed so that they 
correspond to the price and quantity equilibria that prevail in the base scenario and have the 
elasticities as reported in Table 5. 
 
A model structure this simple does not allow estimates of bilateral trade flows. However, the 
model does estimate the impact on world price and it estimates whether each region will either 
export or import, depending on world prices, and domestic supply and demand curves.  
 Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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Table 3: Base line price and quantity estimates 
    
  1999 2004 2009 
 000  tonnes   
Canada   Production 1,525 1,877  1,882 
 Consumption 1,010 1,099  1,171 
    
China  Production 27,553 30,829  35,643 
 Consumption 27,461 30,756  35,592 
    
European Union  Production 17,900 18,183  18,451 
 Consumption 16,750 17,048  17,193 
    
Japan  Production 1,283 1,227  1,149 
 Consumption 2,095 2,162  2,208 
    
USA  Production 8,765 8,814  9,444 
 Consumption 8,600 8,342  8,787 
    
ROW  Numbers  Production 14624 15567  16850 
 Consumption 15325 16552  17891 
    
World  Production 71,650 76,497  83,420 
 Consumption 71,241 75,959  82,841 
Source: Calculated from FAPRI, World Outlook 2000 (June)  
 
Table 4: Iowa-Southern Minnesota Barrow and Gilt Price 
year
Price 




Source: Calculated from FAPRI, World Outlook 2000 (June)   Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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Table 5: The Elasticities of Supply and Demand used in the Simulation Model 
 Elasticity of Demand  Elasticity 
of Supply 
Canada -0.75  1.5
China   -0.3  0.5
EU -0.75  0.9
Japan -0.36  0.83
USA -0.5  1
ROW -0.5  0.9
Source: Srivastava  
4.0 Simulated impacts of GHG policies on  production and trade 
4.1 Description of the likely scenarios 
To illustrate the potential importance of GHG policy on trade and compare the magnitude of 
these effects to other domestic environmental policies, the impact of various polices are 
simulated within the trade model.  In total five simulations made.  
 
Scenario 1 imposes a Pigovian tax of $50/t on all hog producers in the world in 2004, and a $100 
tax in 2009.  Scenario 2 imposes the tax on Canada, US, EU, and Japan without imposing the tax 
on China and the ROW.  Scenario 2 is plausible given the reluctance of China and many other 
lesser developed countries to be signatories to the Kyoto accord.  In Scenario 3, Canada 
unilaterally imposes a GHG tax.  Here it assumed that the other countries will either disregard 
emissions from the hog sector, or they fully subsidize the costs of GHG abatement. Given almost 
unilateral reduced level of subsidy that took place in the grain sector in Canada after the WTO, 
this situation is also plausible.  
 Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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The forth and fifth scenarios simulated impacts of conventional regulation that could curtail the 
expansion of the US and EU. In scenario 4 the United States only expands production by half the 
rate predicted by FAPRI in 2004 and 2009.  This scenario is based upon the idea that 
communities in the USA are currently uneasy and less willing to accept hog expansion in their 
backyard after the recent problems communities in North Carolina have gone through.  In 
scenario five the production levels for the European Union in 2004 and 2009 are held steady at 
1999 production levels.  Consumption levels are assumed to be unchanged.  Once again, this 
model was designed to depict the effects of tougher environmental regulations in countries such 
as the Netherlands and Denmark, which are very large hog producers.  There are already laws in 
place requiring hog producers to scale back their production because of past over-expansion that 
led to nitrogen and phosphorus pollution. These simulations allow a comparison of magnitude 
trade effects of conventional environmental regulation of the hog industry versus GHG 
abatement.  
 
4.2 Simulation results 
The results of the five simulated scenarios are reported in Table 6.  As shown in Simulation 1, 
when all countries apply a Pigovian tax for GHG emissions, there are relatively minor impacts.  
In 2004 with a $50 /t tax on pork, world production is reduced by 1.5% and only 3% in the case 
of the  $100 /t tax. Given the elasticities used in the model, the consumer price increase is 
slightly larger than the price decrease to producers.  
  
The simulation of Scenario 2 where taxes are only applied to the Canada, US, EU and Japan has 
very different results. Here the majority of the tax burden is born by producers in these countries, Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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with a 4.3% and 8% reduction in prices in 2004 and 2009 versus a 1.3% and 3.3% increase in 
consumer prices. There is very little reduction (.6% and 1.5% ) in GHG as China and the ROW 
increase production to offset much of the tax effect on emissions 
 
The futility of a unilateral move to reduce emissions is most clearly shown in Scenario 3 where 
Canada only imposes the Pigovian tax.  Here there is almost no impact on consumer prices ( .13 
and .3%) or world consumption levels, while the price impact on Canadian producers would be 
nearly the full amount of the tax ( 5.5% and 11%).  The result is a significant (8.2 and 16.5%) 
reduction in Canadian production and virtually no impact on GHG emissions as producers in 
other countries offset the reduction in Canadian production. 
 
The impacts on the Canadian hog industry resulting from these three GHG policies differ 
significantly.  With a $50 /t tax applied to all world production, Canadian production declines by 
2.5%, compared to a 6% reduction in production in 2004 when the tax is restricted to OEDC, and 
an 8% drop when it is restricted to Canadian production only.  The differences between the 
simulations’ resultant export levels and values are far more dramatic.  In the first case the higher 
consumer prices restricts Canadian demand that nearly offsets the reduction in production. In this 
case there is a 3% reduction in exports.  When the production tax is placed in Canada only, the 
same $50/t tax reduces exports by 23%.  In this case there is a greater reduction in production, 
virtually none of which is offset by a reduction in consumption because consumer prices are 
unchanged.  In the case of the $100 per tonne tax in 2009, Canadian exports decline by over 
40%.   
 Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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The effect of growth limiting environmental regulation in the US is illustrated in Scenario 4. The 
results of this simulation show almost no impacts on the world price of pork of .02% and .32% in 
2004 and 2009 respectively. These results would suggest that future US regulation of the hog 
industry will have a very small impact on the international price, and therefore have a very 
limited impact the hog industry. 
 
As shown in Scenario 5, an environmental cap on EU hog numbers has a very modest impact on 
the market relative to the FAPRI baseline.  The results of this simulation show an increases in the 
world price of pork by .23% and .54% in 2004 and 2009 respectively.  
 
Overall the environmental restrictions in the US and the EU will have a very limited positive 
impact on the world price and Canadian hog market. This supports the conclusion of Metcalfe 
(1998) that environmental regulations will have little impact in the market place. 
 Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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Table 6: Simulation Results 
Base Case  2004  2009  % Change from Base  
Year      
World Price ($/t)  895  884     
World Quantity Equilibrium (1,000t)  76,498  83,418     
Canadian Consumption (1,000t)      1,099  1,171     
Canada Production (1,000t)  1,877  1,882     
Exports Q (1,000t)  821  753     
Value of Exports (Million $)  734  666     
       
Scenario #1 - GHG tax* -all Countries  2004  2009  % Change from Base  
Producer Price ($/t)  881  846 -1.61% -4.30% 
Consumer price ($/t)  931  946 3.98% 7.01% 
World Quantity Equilibrium (1,000t)  75,064  80,716 -1.87% -3.24% 
Canadian Consumption (1,000t)      -33  -62 -2.99% -5.26% 
Canada Production (1,000t)  -45  -122 -2.41% -6.46% 
Exports Q (1,000t)  808  693 -1.52% -7.96% 
Value of Exports (Million $)  711  586 -3.15% -11.92% 
    
Scenario #2 - GHG tax *imposed in Canada, US, 
Japan and EU 
2004  2009  % Change from Base  
Producer Price ($/t)  857  813 -4.29% -7.98% 
Consumer price ($/t)  907  913 1.29% 3.33% 
World Quantity Equilibrium (1,000t)   76032  82135 -0.61% -1.54% 
Canadian Consumption (1,000t)      -11  -29 -0.97% -2.49% 
Canada Production (1,000t)  -121  -225 -6.44% -11.98% 
Exports Q (1,000t)  710  557 -13.44% -26.05% 
Value of Exports (Million $)  608440  453206 -17.20% -31.95% 
    
Scenario #3 – GHG tax* - Canada only  2004  2009  % Change from Base 
Producer Price ($/t)  846  787 -5.46% -11.00% 
Consumer price ($/t)  896  887 0.13% 0.32% 
World Quantity Equilibrium (1,000t)  76452  83296 -0.06% -0.15% 
Canadian Consumption (1,000t)      -1  -3 -0.09% -0.23% 
Canada Production (1,000t)  -154  -311 -8.19% -16.50% 
Exports Q (1,000t)  668  446 -18.62% -40.85% 
Value of Exports (Million $)  565041  350614 -23.10% -47.36% 
   
Scenario #4- USA one half projected growth  2004  2009  % Change from Base  
World Price ($/t)  895  887  0.02%  0.32%
World Quantity Equilibrium (1,000t)  76,490  83,295  -0.01%  -0.15%
Canadian Consumption (1,000t)      0  -3  -0.02%  -0.24%
Canada Production (1,000t)  1  9  0.03%  0.47%
Exports Q (1,000t)  821  765  0.09%  1.54%
Value of Exports (Million $)  735  678   
      
Scenario #5- European Union Production Unchanged 
from 1999 
2004  2009  % Change from Base  
World Price ($/t)  897  889  0.23%  0.54%
World Quantity Equilibrium (1,000t)  76,416  83,208  -0.11%  -0.25%
Canadian Consumption (1,000t)      -2  -5  -0.17%  -0.40%
Canada Production (1,000t)  6  15  0.34%  0.81%
Exports Q (1,000t)  829  773  0.99%  2.65%
Value of Exports (Million $)  743  687   




5.1 summary and Conclusions  
As trade continues to liberalise in the world, comparative advantage will play a larger role in the 
location of industries.  This is particularly true for the hog industry, which has a globally 
competitive market.  The environment has become an important issue for the hog industry as 
many countries have introduced regulations to limit the impact on the aquatic and terrestrial 
ecosystems. More recently, with the framework convention on climate change, atmospheric 
accumulation of Greenhouse gases has become an important issue.  This study examined the 
extent that environmental policies designed to limit GHG emissions could effect the location of 
hog production and international trade.   
 
The analysis started with the premise that an international agreement to reduce GHG emissions 
will eventually be ratified.  This being the case GHG from all sources will have a shadow value 
and will be potential target for reduction.  While no precise estimates of this shadow value are 
available, the commonly used value of $20/t of CO2 was used to illustrate the effects and 
determine the potential magnitude of impacts.   Based on emissions per tonne of pork a simple 
Pigovian tax of $50/t of pork was imposed in 2004.  This was doubled to a $100/t tax in 2009.  
Three different scenarios were run. In the first scenario, all hog production in the world was 
taxed, in the second, only Canadian, US, EU and Japanese production was taxed and in the final 
case only Canadian hog production was taxed.  The result of the analysis revealed these Pigovian 
taxes were large enough to have significant impacts on production and trade. The impacts tended Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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to somewhat larger that the potential impact of conventional environmental regulation of hog 
industry.   They results also showed that if China and the ROW stayed out of a GHG agreement 
this could have large impact on the location and trade in the hog industry.  The final scenario 
showed that a unilateral move to abate GHG in the hog industry in Canada could reduce exports 
by 23 to 47%.   
 
5.2 Study limitations 
The are many limitations to this very preliminary study.  The $50 Pigovian tax on hog 
production is based on the $20/t cost economy wide CO2 abatement costs. The estimates of these 
costs in the literature range from over $200 per ton to $2/t.  More precise estimates of abatement 
costs are needed.  The analysis uses Canadian estimates of GHG emissions per hog and fixed 
proportions between GHG emissions and hog production.  More analysis is needed to relax each 
of these assumptions as information becomes available. Beghin et al. (1997) showed the linkages 
between trade policies and environmental policies and suggested that they could be used together 
to increase efficiency and mitigate pollution. These types of instruments need to be explored in 
the case of GHG abatement.     
 
5.3 Further research  
The GHG externality of $50 per tonne for pork production suggests that these costs are large 
enough to have an impact on production.  The realized trade and production impacts will very 
much depend on which countries participate in an agreement and how GHG abatement policies 
are introduced in each country.  The estimates presented here show that without universal 
application these policies could substantially alter competitive advantage within the industry and Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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the pattern of trade flows.  The implementation of climate change agreements clearly have the 
potential to significantly affect trade patterns.  These effects would be another source for trade 
disputes, and eventually lead to new trade rules.  Trade economists need to become involved in 
the development of international climate change negotiations, to mitigate at least some of the 
potential trade conflicts that could arise. 
 
 
The are several other areas that warrant further research.  Given the size of Chinese hog 
production, more research into the environmental constraints and policies in China is required.  
Given the potential magnitude of the GHG impacts there is a need to understand the technologies 
that may reduce GHG emissions from hog production.  In order to understand the potential 
impact of GHG on hog production, there is a need to examine the potential affect of GHG 
abatement on poultry and beef production.  If costs in these sectors are increased because of 
GHG policy the pork sector could be a net beneficiary.  There is need to understand these 
relationships better.  Gray, Harper and Highmoore       Comments welcome 
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